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ELECTION SLAPPS: EFFECTIVE AT SUPPRESSING 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND GIVING ANTI-SLAPP 
STATUTES THE SLIP 
Leah McGowan Kelly* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Allowing the states to set finicky rules for ballot access in presidential 
elections places a special burden on independent candidates.  Most states have 
established an intricate network of rules and procedures that independent 
candidates need to follow in order to get on the state’s ballot for the presidential 
election.  If a candidate manages to make it onto a state’s ballot, most states also 
have a mechanism that allows almost anyone to challenge the process the candidate 
went through to get on the ballot.  Citizens can challenge the candidate’s 
nomination petition, and then appeal the decision on the challenge at several 
different levels.  An independent candidate running for national office can become 
embroiled in simultaneous petition challenges, and appeals, throughout the country.  
The process consumes a candidate’s precious resources during a critical time in the 
campaign.  Nominees of the major parties do not face this potential labyrinth of 
litigation. 
A SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) is a lawsuit that 
typically has no merit, but is filed to prevent the defendant from participating in a 
political process.1 The nuance and variance of nomination petition requirements, 
combined with the availability of private challenges to the petitions, lay fertile 
ground for Election SLAPPs.  In the mid-1990’s, many states enacted anti-SLAPP 
statutes.2  These statutes are intended to curb the effects of SLAPPS.3  Anti-SLAPP 
statutes provide a vehicle for early dismissal of frivolous suits that appear to have 
been filed for collateral political purposes.   
When Ralph Nader ran for President in 2004, his political rivals forced his 
campaign to defend against 29 complaints, in 19 different jurisdictions, in the 
months leading up to the election.4  He faced Election SLAPPs.  The complaints 
had no merit, and were filed to stifle his political participation.  The majority of the 
complaints challenged his nomination petitions in various states, and five of the 
complaints alleged violations of campaign finance laws.5  Nader defeated most of 
the challenges to his nomination petition, and all of the challenges to his 
compliance with campaign finance laws, but his challengers succeeded in diverting 
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 1. GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT 3 
(1996). 
 2. See id. at 189. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See Nader v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 567 F.3d 692, 695, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 5. See id. at 695.   
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his campaign resources and thwarting his efforts to get on the ballot in some states.  
When the dust of the 2004 race settled, Nader tried to litigate back.  Eight years and 
two presidential elections after the shenanigans that gave rise to them, Ralph 
Nader’s lawsuits over the use of coordinated, nation-wide ballot challenges to 
sabotage his 2004 Presidential campaign have finally been dismissed – without a 
hearing on the merits.6  Despite years of litigation in various jurisdictions, the 
alleged conspiracy to drain Nader’s campaign by filing frivolous lawsuits has 
escaped judicial examination, let alone judicial sanction, and, ironically, has 
received protection from Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute. 
A review of the coordinated, scattershot litigation launched against Nader in 
the 2004 presidential election shows how petition challenges, and appeals of those 
challenges, stifle the political participation of independent candidates in 
presidential elections, without advancing the state interest of maintaining the 
sanctity of the ballot.  The success of these Election SLAPPs, which are usually 
only filed against candidates who have actually gathered the requisite support to 
compile a valid nomination petition, shows that states should eliminate the 
availability of private challenges to nomination petitions.  In practice, the private 
challenge mechanism does not operate to enforce a state’s nomination petition 
requirements.  Instead, the mechanism is used as a weapon against viable 
candidates who have actually gathered enough legitimate support to threaten an 
opponent.  Allowing private challenges to nomination petitions invites a political 
rival to sabotage an opponent’s campaign by filing frivolous challenges.   
An examination of Nader’s efforts to seek judicial redress for the alleged 
misuse of the judicial system raises the issue of the utility of Maine’s anti-SLAPP 
statute.  When Nader brought suit against those who had coordinated the frivolous 
lawsuits, his tormentors actually used Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute to dismiss his 
case.  So, a statute designed to minimize the impact of SLAPPs has been 
repurposed to protect those who file SLAPPs.  Nader’s struggle as a litigant 
seeking redress in the courts for the onslaught of frivolous litigation shows how 
some anti-SLAPP statutes, like Maine’s, have been used to shelter the litigants they 
were designed to stymie.   
This Article begins by outlining the hurdles an independent candidate needs to 
clear in order to appear on a state’s ballot.  Then, using Nader’s 2004 campaign 
experience as an example, it demonstrates how the availability of private 
challenges to nomination petitions exponentially compounds the burden of initial 
compliance, without any accompanying benefit to the political process or 
advancement of any state interest.  Next, this Article argues the futility of seeking 
legal redress for Election SLAPPs, using Nader’s attempts to do so as an 
illustration.  The procedural history of Nader’s case in Maine also provides an 
example of how some litigants have used Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute to dismiss 
the suits that followed in the wake of their own frivolous lawsuits.  The Article 
concludes by arguing that 1) Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute should not be interpreted 
                                                                                                     
 6. See Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, 2013 ME 51, 66 A.3d 571 (2013); Nader v. Democratic 
Nat’l Comm., 567 F.3d 692 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Nader v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 590 F. Supp. 2d 164 
(D.C. Cir. 2008); Nader v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., No. 09-7004, 2009 WL 4250599 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 
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to allow a singular nonfrivolous petition challenge to protect frivolous petition 
challenges in the same filing from sanction; 2) Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute should 
be applied without either of the burden-shifting mechanisms imposed by the courts 
construing it; and 3) states should eliminate the availability of private challenges to 
nomination petitions. 
II.  ACCESS TO THE PRESIDENTIAL BALLOT 
A.  The Requirements for Nomination Petitions Vary from State to State 
Let’s start with a run-through of the process an independent candidate needs to 
go through in order to appear on a state’s ballot.  Article II of the Constitution 
provides that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof 
may direct, a Number of Electors” who shall select the President of the United 
States.7  State legislatures pass laws and then election administrators, usually 
through a board of elections or a secretary of state’s office, apply the laws and 
establish the regulations that determine how a candidate qualifies to be on a state’s 
general election ballot as a presidential candidate.8  Generally, a candidate may 
appear on a state’s ballot in two ways.  A party that has already established a place 
on the state ballot may nominate the candidate, or the candidate can satisfy the 
state’s signature requirements for ballot access.  Currently, every state and the 
District of Columbia have their own requirements for gathering and submitting 
signatures.9 
So, a presidential candidate who has not been nominated by a party with a 
ballot line must comply with the signature requirements of each state and the 
District of Columbia.  Each state establishes the number of signatures that a 
presidential candidate must collect in order to appear on the ballot.  This number is 
variously based on the state’s population of registered voters, the state’s overall 
population, the number of people who actually voted in the last presidential 
election, the number of people who actually voted in the last election for Governor, 
or a set number that is not directly tied to any of the above.  The number should 
relate to the state’s goal of requiring candidates to show that they have some 
legitimate public support and merit ballot placement.10  
The quantity of required valid signatures, both in number and in relation to the 
population of the state, varies tremendously between states – from as few as 1,000 
signatures in Mississippi to 1% of registered voters in California.11  States have 
                                                                                                     
 7. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.   
 8. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Democrats’ Legal Challenges Impede Nader, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 
2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/19/politics/campaign/19nader.html. 
 9. See id.   
 10. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983).   
 11. New Jersey requires at least 2% of the entire vote case for members of the General Assembly at 
the last preceding election; Mississippi requires, 1,000; Iowa, 1,500; Minnesota and Wisconsin require 
2,000.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:13-5 (West 2013); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-785(1) (West 2013); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 45.1(1) (West 2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 204B.08(3)(a) (West 2013); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 8.20(4) (West 2013).  North Carolina requires 2% of the total number of voters who voted in the 
most recent general election for Governor.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-122 (West 2013).  
California requires 1% of its registered voters at the time of the close of registration prior to the 
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also set different standards for who may sign a petition.  In Texas, for example, 
someone who has voted in the state’s primary election may not sign a third-party 
candidate’s petition for the general election.12  An independent candidate cannot 
start collecting signatures in Texas until after the presidential primaries, and the 
required signatures must be submitted no later than the second Monday in May.13  
In 2008, these rules required an independent candidate, who had to collect 
signatures from 1% of the number of people who voted in the last presidential 
election, to collect 64,076 valid signatures from those who did not vote in the 
primaries, in sixty days.14 
Each state also makes rules concerning who may circulate signature petitions.  
In 2004, approximately 20% of the states, including California, New Jersey, New 
York, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C., 
required circulators of petitions to be registered voters.15  Some states require the 
circulator to be eligible to vote in the state where the circulator is collecting 
signatures.16  Arizona does not allow ex-felons to circulate petitions, even if they 
are registered to vote.17  Arizona also requires circulators to swear that they live in 
a particular county, and to fill in their county of residence in a circulator affidavit 
that is notarized on each petition.18  In D.C., the circulators must complete an 
affidavit wherein they swear that they are registered, qualified electors in D.C., that 
they personally circulated the petition sheets, that they witnessed the signing of 
each signature, and that they have determined from each signer that he or she is 
duly registered to vote in D.C.19   
Each state sets standards for the form of the petition, and for the information 
required from each person signing the petition.  As to the form of the petition, some 
                                                                                                     
preceding general election, which in 2004 was 156,252 signatures.  See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 8400 (West 
2013); Report of Registration, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE (Sept. 3, 2004), http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ 
ror/ror-pages/60day-presgen-04/hist-reg-stats.pdf.  Texas requires an independent candidate to collect 
1% of the number of people who voted in the last presidential election.  See TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 
192.032(d) (West 2013).  Wyoming requires 2% of the votes cast in the last presidential election, which 
in 2004 was 4,916 valid signatures.  See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-304(a) (West 2013); Wyoming Voter 
Registration and Voter Turnout Statistics, WYO. SEC’Y OF STATE, http://soswy.state.wy.us/ 
Elections/Docs/profile.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).  To add color to this number, according to the 
2010 U.S. Census, Cheyenne, the state capital and most populated place in the state, has only 59,466 
people within its boundaries.  See Cheyenne (city), Wyoming, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2012), 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/56/5613900.html.  Oklahoma requires 3% of the votes cast in the 
last presidential election.  See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 10-101.1(1) (West 2013).  In 2004 this 
number amounted to 29,275.  See General Election, OKLA. STATE ELECTION BD (Nov. 2, 2004), 
http://www.ok.gov/elections/The_Archives/Election_Results/2004_Election_Results/General_Election_
2004.html. 
 12. See TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 192.032(f), (g) (West 2013).  In reality, the person can and may 
sign such a petition.  Such a signature provides a ground for a potential petition challenge.  If 
challenged, the signature will later be struck. 
 13. See id. § 192.032(c), (g). 
 14. See THERESA AMATO, GRAND ILLUSION: THE MYTH OF VOTER CHOICE IN A TWO-PARTY 
TYRANNY 37 (2009).   
 15. Id. at 32–33. 
 16. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-315(B)(2) (2013). 
 17. See AMATO, supra note 14, at 33. 
 18. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-265(H) (2013). 
 19. See D.C. CODE § 1-1001.08(b)(2)–(3) (2013). 
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states provide an actual petition or a sample petition, some do not.  Some states 
allow candidates to photocopy forms to circulate; others require that the candidates 
obtain an original form from the state.  According to Theresa Amato, Nader’s 
campaign manager for the 2000 and 2004 elections, the campaign “had to beg 
Hawaii in writing for additional petitions, as they would ration them, costing [the 
campaign] crucial days and lost opportunities to collect signatures.”20  California 
accepts petitions on paper of any size; Maine provides candidates with petitions 
that are on pink, 11” x 17” paper.21  In Ohio, each petition must bear a photocopy 
of the candidate’s signature.22 
States also differ with their requirements concerning a candidate’s affiliation 
with a particular party.  In some states, candidates who are a member of a political 
party may not run as an independent.  When faced with this restriction in Delaware 
and Oregon, the Nader campaign handled vice-presidential candidate Peter Miguel 
Camejo’s membership in the Green Party by obtaining the Independent Party’s line 
(in Delaware) and by offering a “stand-in” vice-presidential candidate (in 
Oregon).23  In some states, a candidate must simply designate a party on the 
signature petitions.  
In some states, the vice-presidential candidate “must appear” on the petition; in 
others, the vice-presidential candidate “may” appear on the petition.  Issues may 
arise regarding the validity of petitions listing stand-in vice presidential candidates 
that were circulated before the presidential candidate named the vice-presidential 
candidate, or before there was a nominating convention to select a vice-presidential 
candidate.24  According to Amato, “[m]ost states don’t say anything about this 
issue in their laws; some states specifically prohibit this substitution and refuse to 
substitute other candidates.”25 
In Illinois and Pennsylvania, the names and addresses of each of a candidate’s 
electors must appear on the signature petitions.26  In Pennsylvania and Maine, a 
candidate’s electors must be registered as independent by a certain date.27  In 
Nebraska, the electors must be from every congressional district in the state.28  
Idaho requires the electors to have lived in the state consecutively for two years.29  
Missouri requires notarized elector declarations of candidacy.30  
Each state sets a date for when a candidate may begin collecting signatures, 
and a date by which the signatures need to be collected and submitted;31 the 
                                                                                                     
 20. AMATO, supra note 14, at 30. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See id. at 31.   
 23. See id.   
 24. See id. at 31–32. 
 25. Id. at 31.   
 26. See id. at 32. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-1038, 32-620(1), amended by 2013 Neb. Legis. Serv. 349 
(West 2012). 
 29. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-606(2) (West 2013). 
 30. See AMATO, supra note 14, at 32. 
 31. In Florida, an independent candidate for president must collect signatures from 1% of registered 
electors by July 15 of each presidential election year; the petitions must be certified by county, one sheet 
per county, with a fee of 10 cents per signature.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 103.021(3), 99.097(4) (West 
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deadlines range from May to September.32  In addition to raw number quotas, some 
states require a certain number of signatures per congressional district.  New 
Hampshire, for example, requires 1,500 valid signatures from each of its two 
congressional districts.33  Virginia requires at least 400 valid signatures from each 
congressional district.34   
Once a campaign masters each state’s requirements, achieving the signature 
quota requires collecting up to double or triple the requisite amount to account for 
inevitable errors.  According to Amato, circulators face a considerable challenge in 
discerning whether they are collecting a signature from a registered voter.  “Most 
people don’t walk around with a voter registration card in their pocket, and it might 
insult even those who do to ask them to flip it out to prove to the circulator that 
they are indeed registered.”35  Or,  “some people think they are registered to vote, 
or are ashamed that they are not, but will tell you that they are and sign your 
petition.36  Further, “[o]ther people have moved since they last voted or registered 
to vote, which in some states means that they are no longer registered, often 
unbeknownst to them.”37  Additionally, “[s]ome people who [are] registered to vote 
sign the address of where they currently live, instead of where they are registered to 
vote, thinking it doesn’t matter; but it does.”38  Errors may also result from typos or 
misspellings.39  Finally, according to Amato, “there are the people who sign 
‘Mickey Mouse’ or ‘Donald Duck’ or the name of [the] candidate; or the people 
who will walk off with your clipboard because they are hostile to your 
candidate.”40  Although collecting double or triple the number of required 
signatures may insure collecting the required amount of valid signatures, some 
states also limit the number of signatures a candidate may submit.41 
When it comes time to submit the petitions, the states have different 
requirements for binding or stapling the petitions, and for numbering or not 
numbering certain petition pages.42  Deadlines for submission differ by day, by 
time of day, and by whether the submission should be made once, or on a rolling 
                                                                                                     
2013).  In 2004, an independent candidate would have been required to collect 93,024 valid signatures 
by July 15, 2004.  See County Voter Registration by Party, FLA. DIV. OF ELECTIONS (2002), 
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/voter-registration/statistics/pdf/2002/2002genparty.pdf. 
 32. See AMATO, supra note 14, at 28-29.   
 33. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 655:42 (2008 & Supp. 2012). 
 34. See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-543 (West 2013). 
 35. See AMATO, supra note 14, at 34. 
 36. See id. at 35. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See id.   
 40. Id.  According to Amato, in 2004, a third party or independent candidate had approximately six 
and a half months to collect 634,727 valid signatures across the United States.  Id.  This broke down to 
collecting almost 4,000 valid signatures a day.  Id.  Amato states that a third-party or independent 
campaign really had to collect 8,000 to 12,000 signatures a day, to insure against signatures from 
unregistered voters, a state’s imperfect voter registration records, and the inevitable lawsuits and 
challenges faced by serious candidates.  Id. 
 41. Maine requires 4,000 valid signatures and only allows a candidate to submit 6,000 signatures.  
See 21-A M.R.S.A. § 354(5)(A) (2008 & Supp. 2012). 
 42. See AMATO, supra note 14, at 38.   
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basis.43   
In states such as Massachusetts, Maine, and North Carolina, where circulators had 
to carry a separate petition for each town, city, or county, those petitions must be 
hand delivered, or mailed and received, in each and every town, city, or county 
where there are signatories to the petitions – thus necessitating, in some states like 
Massachusetts, delivery to over one hundred or more turn-in locations.44 
North Carolina requires independent candidates to validate petition signatures first 
with the chairman of the Board of Elections of the county in which the signatures 
were obtained, and then validate the signatures with the State Board of Electors.45   
In short, obtaining ballot access through nomination petitions requires 
compliance with innumerable and varying regulations.46  Failure to comply with 
these tedious and fine-grained regulations means not getting on the ballot.  
Campaigns have to spend endless time, energy, and money figuring out what the 
requirements in each state are and complying with them. 
B.  Nomination Petitions are Open to Private Challenges 
Although the requirements for a valid nomination petition differ from state to 
state, most states make a candidate’s nomination petition open to private 
challenges.47  This means that a virtually unlimited number of people may subject a 
candidate to the burden of defending a petition challenge during the campaign 
period.   
The nuance and variance of petition requirements from state to state lay fertile 
ground for petition challenges.  The high volume of required signatures, the 
compressed time within which signatures may be gathered, the specific 
requirements for circulators, the requirements for the form of the petition itself, the 
                                                                                                     
 43. See id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 163-122(a)(2); 163-182.4(b) (West 2013). 
 46. The variation itself is hard to justify in a national election.  Most states establish one set of 
nomination petition requirements for independent candidates.  The requirements apply to independent 
candidates who plan to run for a state office, or for president of the country.  When the state legislature 
determines whether the burden of complying with the nomination petition requirements is unduly 
burdensome, one wonders whether the burden is examined solely in the context of a candidate running 
for state office, or whether the analysis accounts for a candidate planning to run for national office, who 
is also trying to comply with the different requirements of all the other territories, at roughly the same 
time. 
 47. See, e.g.,  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.552(2) (West 2013); 21-A M.R.S.A. § 356(2) (2008 
& Supp. 2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-351(A) (2013).  In some states, like Illinois, nomination 
petition signatures are accepted unless they are challenged.  See Delay v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 726 
N.E.2d 755, 759 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (holding that state law does not authorize election officials to 
challenge nomination papers sua sponte).  Under the Illinois system, it seems that only the petitions of 
serious candidates would receive challenges, while the petitions of nonserious candidates would not 
trigger any concern or challenge.  Allowing private parties, as opposed to a government agency, to 
challenge a petition leads to uneven enforcement of ballot access requirements.  A candidate serious 
enough to siphon significant votes from one of the two major parties would predictably face more 
challenges than a less serious candidate or a candidate that drew support evenly from both parties.  This 
distortion does not serve a state’s interest in avoiding voter confusion or keeping nonserious candidates 
off of the ballot.  See Robert Yablon, Validation Procedures and the Burden of Ballot Access 
Regulations, 115 YALE L.J. 1833, 1840-41 (2006).  
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restrictions concerning who may sign a petition, the fact that restrictions on these 
factors vary from state to state, and the variable of interacting with the public at 
large make it likely that the determined challenger will find a way to assert some 
instance of noncompliance.  Even if a candidate complies perfectly with the 
nomination petition requirements of a particular state, the determined opponent can 
always bring a challenge over the propriety of the state-imposed requirements that 
the candidate actually followed, which happened to the 2004 Nader Campaign in 
Maine.48 
The petition requirements also lend themselves to sabotage by an opponent.  
An opponent could plant faulty or fraudulent signatures on a petition in order to lay 
a foundation for a later petition challenge.  Considering the intricate and various 
regulations of each state’s ballot restrictions, and the aspects of the signature 
gathering process that are outside a candidate’s control, it is hard to imagine a 
“baseless” challenge to a signature petition.   
III. PRIVATE CHALLENGES TO NOMINATION PETITIONS  
COMPOUND THE BURDEN FACING INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES  
WITHOUT ADVANCING ANY STATE INTEREST 
Nader’s experience with Election SLAPPs shows how the availability of 
private challenges to nomination petitions exponentially compounds the initial 
burden of compliance with each state’s petition requirements, without serving the 
state interest of keeping unqualified candidates off the ballot. 
A. Nader and the 2000 Presidential Election 
In the presidential election of 2000, runner-up Al Gore received more popular 
votes than winning candidate George W. Bush.49  Bush won the 2000 presidential 
election with 271 electoral votes to Gore’s 266 electoral votes.  Disappointed 
democrats blamed this election result on Nader, who drew 2.74% of the popular 
vote and is said to have drawn critical votes away from Gore, the Democratic 
Party’s candidate.50  In the final weeks of the campaign, in fact, Republican 
Leadership Council ran pro-Nader ads in a few states in an effort to split the liberal 
vote.51  For its part, the Gore campaign advertised the similarities between Gore 
and Nader and pressed the fact that Gore had a better chance of winning than 
Nader.52  In the aftermath of the close race, many viewed Nader as the “spoiler” of 
the 2000 presidential election.   
                                                                                                     
 48. In Maine, the Maine Democratic Party challenged the validity of the petition forms provided to 
independent candidates by Maine’s Secretary of State.  See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 49. See 2000 Presidential Popular Vote Summary, FED. ELECTION COMM’N (2001), 
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2000/prespop.htm. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Laura Meckler, GOP Group to Air Pro-Nader TV Ads, WASH POST, Oct. 17, 2000, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/aponline/20001027/aponline115918_000.htm. 
 52. See Katharine Q. Seelye, The Campaign: The Vice President; Barnstorming Nader Turf, Gore 
Draws 30,000, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2000, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/27/us/the-
2000-campaign-the-vice-president-barnstorming-nader-turf-gore-draws-30000.html. 
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B. Nader and the 2004 Presidential Election 
In 2004, Nader ran for president again.  This time, he faced nearly 30 
simultaneous complaints against his candidacy, in forums across the country.53  No 
such actions were filed against him in the 2000 election.  Nader alleges that the 
Democratic National Committee (“DNC”) and its affiliates orchestrated the 
complaints.  Nader’s campaign faced complaints in 18 different state courts 
concerning ballot eligibility, and five complaints before the Federal Election 
Commission (“FEC”) concerning alleged violations of campaign finance laws.54  
Typically, the challenges to the nomination petitions would start with a state 
administrative hearing, followed by multiple appeals to state or federal courts.55  
The complaints lodged with the FEC required a response from the Campaign 
(within 15 days) and compliance with the FEC as it investigated the complaints.56  
The Campaign faced these complaints in the campaign period between June and 
September of 2004.57   
On the merits, the Campaign “won” 23 of the 29 complaints filed against it.58  
The FEC dismissed all of the complaints filed against the Campaign, though not 
until April 2006.59  Nader ultimately appeared on the ballot in 13 of the 18 states in 
which his nomination petitions were challenged.  The ballot access challenges 
succeeded in four states – Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Illinois, preventing 
Nader from appearing on the general election ballot in these states.60  After 
withdrawing his nomination papers in response to a challenge, and failing to 
prevail on his subsequent challenge to Arizona’s filing deadline, Nader also did not 
appear on the Arizona ballot.61  In some states, like Maine, where the Maine 
Democratic Party filed two complaints, the Campaign prevailed in every 
administrative and court challenge to its nomination papers, until the appeals 
processes were exhausted.62    
According to Nader, the challenges were frivolous, and brought by the DNC 
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and its affiliates for the collateral purpose of draining the Campaign of money and 
other resources.63  The DNC didn’t coordinate nation-wide ballot challenges 
because they thought that Nader had failed to gather enough support to qualify to 
appear on the ballot in each state.  Instead, the DNC coordinated nation-wide ballot 
challenges because it perceived Nader as a serious political contender who 
threatened to siphon votes away from the democratic candidate.  The DNC did not 
use the ballot challenge process for its intended purpose of keeping unsupported 
candidates off of the ballot.  Instead, the DNC used the process to eliminate a 
candidate because he was actually supported. 
Nader alleges that certain officials of the DNC preemptively declared, even 
before Nader announced his 2004 candidacy, that they would challenge his ballot 
eligibility.64  Nader also alleges that the DNC funded and coordinated the 
nationwide challenges.65 Toby Moffett, a former Connecticut congressman and 
president of the Ballot Project, told the New York Times that he and former 
Representative Elizabeth Holtzman were trying to “drain [Nader] of resources and 
force him to spend his time and money.”66  Moffett was also quoted by the New 
Mexican in late July 2004 as saying that “[w]e’re going to make [Nader] spend 
time, money, resources.”67   
The DNC’s coordination of petition challenges made perverse use of the 
petition-challenging processes available in every state.  The aggregate burden of 
responding to 18 different state petition challenges creates a hurdle to ballot access 
that even candidates with the adequate prerequisite voter support may not clear.  
The DNC aggregated a series of processes aimed at eliminating non-serious 
candidates from a state ballot in order to eliminate a serious candidate for national 
office. 
Although the challengers “lost” the overwhelming majority of the complaints 
filed, the challengers achieved their intended goal.  The Campaign lost substantial 
money and other resources defending the lawsuits during a critical time in the 
campaign cycle.  As Moffett told the Washington Post in August 2004, “[w]e 
wanted to neutralize [Nader’s] campaign by forcing him to spend money and 
resources defending these things, but much to our astonishment we’ve actually 
been more successful than we thought we’d be in stopping him from getting on at 
all.”68  The lawsuits diverted resources that would have otherwise been spent 
gaining ballot access in the unchallenged states.69  As a result of losing ballot 
access in some states in 2004, the Campaign was also unable to establish a ballot 
line in those states for 2008.70  After the 2004 election, Moffett reported to The 
Guardian UK, that “[w]e distracted [Nader] and drained him of resources.  I’d be 
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less than honest if I said it was all about the law.  It was about stopping Bush from 
getting elected.”71  The coordinated, nation-wide lawsuits succeeded in 
marginalizing the Campaign’s efforts to fully participate in the 2004 presidential 
election. 
Nader garnered fewer votes in 2004 than he had in 2000.72  He appeared on the 
ballot as an independent candidate in 34 states and received 465,650 votes, for 0.38 
% of the popular vote.73  Bush won another election.  John Kerry, the DNC’s 2004 
candidate, came in second.  Nader finished third.  The challengers lost most of their 
lawsuits, succeeded in disabling the Campaign, but did not achieve their ultimate 
goal of winning the presidential race for Kerry.  The challengers did not serve any 
state interest in keeping an unqualified candidate off of the ballot, as, in most cases, 
Nader had met the petition requirements in the first instance and ultimately 
appeared on the ballot. 
C. Challenges to the Campaign’s Petition in Maine 
The petition challenges in Maine provide an example of the litigation faced by 
the Campaign in 18 different states.  At heart, the Maine challenges were based on 
a typo, the Campaign’s use of the petition forms provided by the Secretary of State, 
and the defendant’s assertion (unsupported by statute or practice) that qualifications 
for electors should also apply to candidates.  Although appealed to exhaustion, the 
Maine challenges failed at every level. 
A nearly painful level of detail is required to relay the quality of the initial 
challenges to Nader’s nomination petitions in Maine, and the baseless nature of the 
exhaustive appeals.  The following admittedly-dense-with-detail explanation takes 
the reader into the thickets of ballot access laws in Maine, but provides only a taste 
of the litigation faced by the Campaign in a 12-week period, across the country.  
The details of the Campaign’s experience in Maine provide insight into the 
effectiveness of Election SLAPPs, and the thickets of Maine’s ballot access laws 
show why this area of law is such fertile ground for them. 
1. Nomination Petition Requirements in Maine 
Maine requires an independent candidate to designate four electors, for 
Maine’s four electoral votes, and to name the electors on the signature petitions.74  
The signature petitions that are circulated are technically on behalf of these 
electors.75  The slate of presidential electors is necessary to get the names of 
independent candidates, who run as unenrolled candidates in Maine, on the ballot 
for the November election.76  The legal and practical effect of the Secretary of 
State’s acceptance of the signature petitions is to include the independent 
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candidate(s) on the November ballot, though technically the votes are cast for the 
slate of electors supporting these candidates.77  If successful, these electors would 
then act as proxies for the candidates in casting their ballots as part of the Electoral 
College.78   
Each elector must be a resident of and a registered voter in the electoral 
division the elector seeks to represent.79  Each elector must sign and file a 
candidate’s consent form, on which the elector declares his or her place of 
residence, states that he or she will accept the nomination, states that he or she has 
not been enrolled in a party qualified to hold a primary election after March 1st of 
the election year, and states that he or she meets the other qualifications to be an 
elector, as set forth in section 21-A M.R.S.A. § 352.80  A municipal registrar in 
each of the towns where the electors reside and are registered to vote must also 
certify that the elector was not enrolled in a qualified party after March 1st of the 
election year, and that the elector had not applied to change his or her enrollment 
status on or after January 1st of the election year.81 
So, the nomination petitions are technically for a slate of four presidential 
elector-candidates.  Maine requires a campaign to submit 4,000 valid signatures, 
but restricts a campaign to submitting 6,000 signatures to satisfy this requirement.82  
The nomination petitions are due by August 1st of each election year.83  They must 
consist of: 1) “Non-Party Nomination Petition” forms containing signatures of at 
least 4,000 registered voters, certified by the registrars of numerous municipalities; 
and 2) four “Non-Party Presidential Elector Consent and Certification of 
Unenrollment” forms completed by each of the four presidential elector-candidates, 
and by the registrars in each of their respective municipalities of residence.84  The 
Secretary of State’s office designs both of these forms and provides them to those 
seeking nomination by petition.85 
Nader’s campaign used the forms provided by the Secretary of State.  It 
submitted the signatures to the registrar of the municipality, and then refiled the 
signatures with the Secretary of State.  Maine’s Secretary of State then determined 
that Nader’s campaign had filed 4,128 valid signatures – enough to satisfy the 
statutory requirement.86  Two challenges followed immediately after the 
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Secretary’s determination. 
2. The DNC’s Challenges Failed at Every Level 
Dorothy Melanson, the head of the Democratic Party in Maine, challenged the 
signature petitions on six grounds:87  
(1) use of a fictitious presidential elector in violation of state statute;  
(2) failure by candidates to file consent forms in violation of state statute;  
(3) failure by candidates to unenroll as required by state statute;  
(4) failure to certify electors’ status as unenrolled “on the petition”;  
(5) false affirmations by circulators in violation of state statute;  
(6) erroneous acceptance by officials of incorrect or missing address information 
in violation of state statute.88 
The challenges triggered a hearing before a Secretary of State departmental 
Hearing Officer, which was scheduled for August 30, 2004.  The hearing lasted two 
days and included the presentation of legal arguments and testimony from 
approximately twelve witnesses.89  The Hearing Officer issued a recommendation 
to the Secretary of State on September 2, 2004.90  The Hearing Officer 
recommended rejecting all of the challenges to the nomination petitions.91  The 
challengers had an opportunity to file objections with the Secretary of State, which 
Melanson did, by September 3, 2004.92  Upon review of the recommendation, the 
objections, and the record of the hearing, the Secretary of State adopted the 
Hearing Officer’s Report and Recommendation in a decision dated September 8, 
2004.93 
The first challenge concerned the birth name of one of Nader’s presidential 
electors, “Joseph Noble Snowdeal.”  Mr. Snowdeal, however, “has been known 
exclusively in his community as ‘J. Noble Snowdeal.’”94  Mr. Snowdeal’s consent 
form and two of the 479 petitions accurately identified him as “J. Noble 
Snowdeal,” but the remaining petitions identified him as “John Noble Snowdeal.”95  
Melanson argued for invalidation of the petitions that identified Nader’s elector as 
“John,” instead of “J.” or “Joseph.”  On this basis, she claimed that Nader was 
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using a fictitious presidential elector.96 
The Hearing Officer found that “. . . the name ‘John Noble Snowdeal’ does not 
represent a fictitious person, but instead is an incorrect statement of a real elector’s 
first name.”97  The Hearing Officer suggested that “the unique combination of 
middle and last name would make it unlikely that anyone reviewing the petition 
would be misled.”98  The Hearing Officer also pointed out that Melanson had 
presented no evidence of anyone actually being misled, and no evidence to rebut 
the explanation that the incorrect first name was an honest mistake.99 
The Hearing Officer also rejected Melanson’s second and third challenges, that 
Nader and Camejo failed to file consent forms and unenroll, because these 
challenges were premised on a misunderstanding of Maine’s statute.100  Maine’s 
statute requires that “[a] person who seeks nomination by petition” must file a 
consent form and an enrollment form if enrolled in a party, but neither Nader nor 
Camejo were seeking nomination through the petition signatures.101  As discussed 
above, technically, the campaign’s presidential electors were seeking nomination 
through the petitions.  The consent and unenrollment requirements only apply to 
the presidential electors, not to the actual presidential candidates.102 
In her fourth challenge, Melanson argued that the signature petition forms, 
designed by the Secretary of State, did not ask for all of the information required by 
Maine’s election statutes, on each page.103  Melanson argued that the Secretary of 
State therefore erred by certifying Nader’s petitions, which utilized this form.  Her 
argument was based on 21-A M.R.S.A. § 353, which states that: 
A person who seeks nomination by petition qualifies by filing a nomination 
petition and consent as provided in section 354 and 355.  If enrolled, the person 
must also withdraw enrollment in a party on or before March 1st to be eligible to 
file a petition as a candidate in that election year, as provided in section 145.  The 
registrar, or clerk at the request or upon the absence of the registrar, in the 
candidate’s municipality of residence must certify to that fact on the petition.104 
Melanson argued that the two separate forms – one for signatures, and one for 
the elector’s consent and certification of unenrollment, meant that the necessary 
information was not all on the same petition.  Melanson’s reading of the statute 
required all of the required information to be contained on every signature page.  
She argued that with two separate forms, the certifications were not on the face of 
the petition.105   
The Secretary of State argued that the forms, submitted together, constituted 
the petition.106  The Secretary of State pointed out its authority, under the general 
                                                                                                     
 96. See id. 
 97. Melanson, 2004 WL 3196784, at *2 (quoting the Hearing Officer).   
 98. Id. 
 99. See id.  
 100. Melanson, 2004 WL 3196784, at *3. 
 101. 21-A M.R.S.A. § 353 (2008 & Supp. 2012) (emphasis added). 
 102. See Melanson, 2004 WL 3196784, at *3. 
 103. Id. 
 104. 21-A M.R.S.A. § 353 (emphasis added). 
 105. Melanson, 2004 WL 3196784, at *3. 
 106. See  Brief of Respondent/Appellee at 9, Melanson, 2004 ME 127, 861 A.2d 641. 
206 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1 
election statutes, to establish the forms necessary to carry out elections.  The 
Secretary of State also pointed out that the consent and certification of 
unenrollment forms for all four electors, as well as the names and addresses of all 
four electors, which also needed to be included on the petition, would take up over 
half of a page and leave little room on the form for signatures.107 The Secretary of 
State also argued that this additional information would serve no purpose because 
the election statutes don’t even require this information to be added to the petition 
until after registered voters have added their signatures.  The additional information 
on the forms would not even inform those signing the petition because it would be, 
or could be, added to the form after signatures were collected.  The Secretary of 
State argued that using a separate form should not run afoul of the statute.108  
On this issue as well, the Hearing Officer agreed with the Secretary of State.  
The Hearing Officer acknowledged the Secretary of State’s authority under 21-A 
M.R.S.A. § 21 to “establish the form and content of all forms, lists, documents and 
records required by or necessary to the efficient operation of” Maine elections.109  
The Hearing Officer also looked to 21-A M.R.S.A. § 354, which states that 
nomination petitions “shall be on a form provided by the Secretary of State,” and 
“a nomination petition may contain as many separate papers as necessary.”110  The 
Hearing Officer also explained that practical considerations warranted the use of 
two separate forms for the nomination petitions.111  As it stood, each petition 
needed to include the circulators’ verification statements and the registrar’s 
certification of voters’ signatures, because these certifications related solely to the 
particular signatures appearing in each petition form.112  To add a registrar’s 
certification of unenrollment for each of the four electors, in addition to the 
circulator’s verification and the registrar’s certification as to individual voters, 
would leave little space for signatures.113  The Hearing Officer also stated that even 
though there are two forms, the Secretary of State considers both forms to be part 
of the nomination petition, and both forms have to be completed and filed in order 
for the nomination to be accepted.114  Finally, the Hearing Officer pointed out that 
putting the certifications of unenrollment for all four presidential electors on the 
face of the petitions would not inform voters.  Because the certificates of 
unenrollment do not need to be completed before voters sign the petitions, this 
portion of the petition would most likely be blank when voters were actually asked 
to sign the form.115   
The Hearing Officer also recommended rejecting the remaining challenges 
concerning false affirmations by circulators and acceptance of incorrect or missing 
address information.116  The Hearing Officer provided numerous and solid grounds 
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for rejecting Melanson’s challenges, and, as mentioned above, the Secretary of 
State accepted the Hearing Officer’s recommendation.117 
Nonetheless, Melanson appealed the Secretary of State’s decision concerning 
her first four challenges, arguing that the Secretary of State had abused its 
discretion in adopting the Hearing Officer’s Recommendation.  Melanson’s appeal 
went to the Superior Court of Maine.118  The Superior Court granted Nader and 
Camejo’s motion to intervene; counsel for all three parties – Melanson, 
Nader/Camejo, and the Secretary of State – met an expedited briefing schedule, 
followed by oral argument before the Superior Court on September 24, 2004.119  
On September 27, 2004, Judge Studstrup of the Superior Court affirmed the 
decision of the Secretary of State based on the evidence of record, the Hearing 
Officer’s report, and the oral and written arguments of the parties.120 
Judge Studstrup found that the testimony of Mr. Snowdeal sufficiently 
defeated Melanson’s allegations concerning the Campaign’s use of a “fictitious” 
elector.121  Finding the use of “John Noble Snowdeal,” as opposed to “J. Noble 
Snowdeal” or “Joseph Noble Snowdeal,” on some of the petitions to be an 
immaterial typographical error, Judge Studstrup cited to the “immaterial 
irregularities provision” of 21-A M.R.S.A. § 3(1).122  Judge Studstrup found that: 
[T]he analysis by the hearing officer, and particularly the lack of any evidence of 
confusion by those signing or reviewing the petitions is persuasive.  Mr. Snowdeal 
is a living, breathing person who testified before the Hearing Officer, not a 
fictitious would-be elector created to fool petition signers.  Acceptance of the 
petitions with the incorrect first name is appropriate, whether as a matter of 
application of [the Immaterial Irregularities Statute] or as an exercise of the 
Secretary’s discretion on questions of this type.123 
Judge Studstrup also affirmed the Secretary of State’s ruling on the second and 
third challenges, which concerned the absence of consent and unenrollment forms 
from the candidates.  Judge Studstrup deferred to the Secretary of State’s 
interpretation of the laws that it administers.  He noted that “[h]istorically, the 
Secretary has required that only the slate of electors file such consent and 
unenrollment forms because technically it is the electors who are being elected, not 
the actual candidates for the office of president and vice-president.”124  The 
candidates were therefore not required to file consent and unenrollment forms, and 
the fact that Mr. Camejo was a member of the Green Party in California did not 
matter.  Neither Camejo nor Nader were required to file the forms, so it did not 
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matter that they weren’t, in fact, “unenrolled.”   
Judge Studstrup also affirmed the Secretary of State’s ruling on the fourth 
challenge – that the petitions supplied by the Secretary of State did not comply with 
the petition requirements set forth in the election statutes.  Here, Judge Studstrup 
also deferred to the Secretary of State’s decisions interpreting the laws that it 
administers, stating:125   
For many years the Secretary has followed a practice that incorporates both the 
petition form and the consent and certification, though two documents, as one 
petition. . . . The Secretary’s interpretation of the statute provides the needed 
information even if not on the front page.  With the Secretary’s interpretation and 
practice, information potential signers may wish [to see] is available to the curious.  
At the same time, the candidate’s interest in getting on the ballot clearly outweighs 
the interest of having all four certifications appear on the face of the petition, when 
they are available elsewhere.126 
Undeterred, Melanson, the head of the Maine Democratic Party, appealed 
Judge Studstrup’s decision concerning the fourth challenge.127  The Supreme 
Judicial Court of Maine (Law Court) affirmed the Superior Court’s decision.128  
Because the Superior Court was acting as an intermediate court of appeals, the Law 
Court reviewed the decision of the Secretary of State directly for errors of law, 
abuse of discretion, or findings not supported by the record.129  Per standard canons 
of statutory construction, the Law Court, in construing the statute, attempted to 
give effect to legislative intent by examining the plain meaning of the statutory 
language.130  It concluded that the language of 21-A M.R.S.A. § 353 requiring 
certification “on the petition” was ambiguous when read in conjunction with § 354, 
which states that a petition “may contain as many separate papers as necessary.”131  
Because the Law Court found the statute to be ambiguous, it reviewed whether the 
Secretary of State’s construction was reasonable.132 
The Law Court noted the mandate of title 21-A, that the “[t]he Secretary of 
State may establish the form and content of all forms, lists, documents and records 
required by or necessary to the efficient operation of this Title.”133  The Law Court 
found that “[a]llowing the unenrollment certification forms and the circulating 
petition forms to be collectively considered ‘the petition’ certainly supports the 
efficient operation of the nomination process.”134  It also found the legislative 
history of section 353 to show that “the existence of the certification, not its 
location, is the primary purpose of the certification requirement.”135  The Law 
Court rejected Melanson’s argument that the purpose of certification is to inform 
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the public of an elector candidate’s party status prior to the distribution of a 
petition.  It stated that “[t]he purpose of the certification is to aid the Secretary in 
fulfilling his responsibilities in the election process by ensuring that any person 
who may be placed on a ballot meets the statutory requirements.”136  The Law 
Court concluded that “[t]he purpose of the certification, the legislative history, and 
the Secretary of State’s authority to prescribe forms for all provisions of title 21-A 
pursuant to 21-A M.R.S.A. § 21, convinces us that the Secretary’s interpretation of 
the statute is both reasonable and warranted when reading the statute in context.”137  
The court deferred to the reasoning of the Secretary of State in interpreting the 
statute to permit the certification to appear on an approved form deemed to be part 
of the petition.138   
So, although Melanson issued an objection to the Report and Recommendation 
of the Hearing Officer, appealed the decision of the Secretary of State, and 
appealed the decision of the Superior Court, none of the four judicial bodies that 
entertained her challenges found merit in any of them.  In Maine, as in other states, 
the private challenges, and the appeals of the decisions made on those challenges, 
did not operate to keep unqualified candidates off of Maine’s ballot.  To the 
contrary, the challenge mechanisms were used to try to keep a qualified candidate 
off of the ballot, and to tie up his resources.  Nader became the target of these 
challenges and appeals because he had enough support to put together a valid 
nomination petition, not because there was any indication that he lacked the 
requisite voter support.  Candidates without any real support from voters, the 
candidates whose petitions should be challenged, are unlikely to inspire a petition 
challenge. 
IV.  ELECTION SLAPPS EVADE JUDICIAL SANCTION 
A.  The Campaign’s Lawsuits Against the DNC 
Between October 2007 and November 2009, Nader filed four lawsuits seeking 
redress for the Democratic Party’s use of frivolous lawsuits to sabotage his 
campaign.139  Three of the lawsuits ultimately ended up before the D.C. Court of 
Appeals and the last lawsuit was ultimately dismissed pursuant to an order from 
Maine’s highest court, in the summer of 2013.140  The six-years of hard-fought 
litigation, which never even led to a trial on the merits, show the futility of seeking 
meaningful relief from Election SLAPPs brought during the three-month election 
cycle. 
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1.  The D.C. Lawsuits  
In the first of the lawsuits to come before the D.C. Court of Appeals, the court 
declined to affirm the District Court’s dismissal under the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine, a body of law arguably designed to solve other problems.141  Instead, after 
noting that the lawsuit “present[ed] interesting legal issues of first impression,”142 
the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal on statute of limitations grounds.143   
Before affirming the dismissal on statute of limitations grounds, however, the 
court acknowledged the difficulty a court would face in ruling on malicious 
prosecution and abuse of process claims based on the facts of Nader’s case.  The 
court stated that the case would turn on Nader’s ability to prove a pattern of filings 
that were objectively baseless and intentionally so, meaning that Nader would have 
to show that the defendants filed the petition challenges knowing that they were 
false.144  The court accepted Nader’s theory of special injury for both claims: that 
the pattern of baseless litigation launched by the democrats deprived him “so 
dramatically of resources that he was unable to meaningfully campaign for the 
presidency.”145  The court interpreted Nader’s claim as an “aggregated, 
conspiratorial theory of misuse of the judicial process.”146   
Given that a few of the challenges succeeded, the court expressed concern over 
whether the complaint alleged “a strategy of repeatedly filing deliberately false 
claims.”147  The court explained that it would need to decide whether Nader must 
prove that the Democrats’ overall strategy was itself objectively baseless or 
whether it would be sufficient for Nader to show only that the Democrats’ strategy 
resulted in more than one baseless suit.”148   
The showing required by the court would also have choice of law implications.  
If the court required plaintiffs to prove that the defendants’ overall strategy was 
itself objectively baseless, D.C. law would apply.149  If the court only required 
Nader to show that the defendants’ strategy resulted in more than one baseless suit, 
choice of law issues would emerge: 
[W]e would face the choice of law problem in marking the boundary between a 
Democratic loss and a baseless lawsuit. . . [I]f each suit requires separate 
consideration, we would face nineteen separate legal standards, each having at 
least three inquiries: (1)  What makes a valid ballot challenge in State X? (2)  
What is State X’s law of probable cause for purposes of malicious prosecution? 
and (3)  Does State X have a special standard for, say, sending a letter to an 
election commission or for election law issues in general?  Almost all these legal 
issues are questions of state law on which we lack instructive precedents.  And this 
list is hardly exhaustive.150 
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After outlining some of the issues that an analysis on the merits would raise, 
the court took the less laborious approach of affirming the dismissal on statute of 
limitations grounds.151  The court’s opinion gives an ominous warning about the 
challenges that a plaintiff, and the court, would face in a suit that sought redress for 
this particular brand of Election SLAPP.  The D.C. Court of Appeals eventually 
dismissed the remaining two suits before it on claim preclusion and res judicata 
grounds.152   
2.  The Maine Lawsuit 
After the dismissals of the D.C. lawsuits, Nader filed a new complaint in 
Maine’s state court.153  The plaintiffs in this suit, Nader (as candidate), and 
Christopher Droznick, Nancy Oden, and Rosemary Whittaker (his 2004 Maine 
presidential electors), brought claims against the Maine Democratic Party, the 
Democratic National Committee, Kerry-Edwards 2004, Inc., the Ballot Project, 
Inc., Dorothy Melanson, Terry McAuliffe, and Toby Moffitt.  The plaintiffs 
brought claims of civil conspiracy, abuse of process and wrongful use of civil 
proceedings (a tort in Maine similar to malicious prosecution) arising from the 
alleged groundless and abusive litigation against the campaign during the 2004 
presidential election.154  The plaintiffs alleged that the nomination petition 
challenges, the subpoenas, the discovery requests, and the related appeals filed or 
issued by defendants were baseless.155  The plaintiffs further alleged that the 
coordinated onslaught of this baseless litigation was calculated to harass and 
embarrass the candidates’ electors, and to obstruct and drain funds from the 
candidates, thereby interfering with the candidates’ rights to run for public 
office.156   
Ironically, the Maine lawsuit was initially dismissed pursuant to Maine’s anti-
SLAPP statute – a statute intended to protect parties from frivolous lawsuits 
designed to stifle political participation.157  On appeal of the dismissal, however, 
the highest court in Maine announced a change to the standard applied to the anti-
SLAPP statute and remanded the case.158  The initial dismissal of Nader’s lawsuit 
via Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute illuminated two burden-shifting mechanisms, 
which courts had previously tacked on to the statute when they applied it, that 
made the statute yield perverse results.  The Law Court announced that it was 
eliminating one of the burden-shifting mechanisms that rendered the statute 
unconstitutional, but it left the other burden-shifting mechanism in place.  It 
remanded the case and directed the trial court to apply the new standard.  It looked 
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as though Nader was going to have his day in court.   
The trial court applied the new standard and denied defendant’s attempts to 
dismiss Nader’s suit via the anti-SLAPP statute.159  On appeal of this decision, 
however, the Law Court retreated from its initial opinion and directed the trial court 
to dismiss Nader’s suit.160  The second Law Court decision muddies the waters on 
anti-SLAPP jurisprudence.  Although its first opinion purports to announce a new 
standard, its second opinion dictates an application of the “new” standard that 
sounds much like the old unconstitutional application.  Ultimately, Maine’s anti-
SLAPP statute was used to dismiss a lawsuit that sought redress for . . . SLAPPs. 
V. MAINE’S ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE 
A. Maine’s Anti-SLAPP Statute 
Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute states: 
When a moving party asserts that the civil claims, counterclaims or cross claims 
against the moving party are based on the moving party’s exercise of the moving 
party’s right of petition under the constitution of the United States or the 
Constitution of Maine, the moving party may bring a special motion to dismiss.  
The court shall advance the special motion so that it may be heard and determined 
with as little delay as possible.  The court shall grant the special motion, unless the 
party against whom the special motion is made shows that the moving party’s 
exercise of its right of petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any 
arguable basis in law and that the moving party’s acts caused actual injury to the 
responding party.  In making its determination, the court shall consider the 
pleading and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the 
liability or defense is based.161 
The trial court initially found that Nader’s claims were based on defendants’ 
exercise of their right of petition.162  The trial court then found that Nader failed to 
show that the defendants’ challenges were “devoid of any reasonable factual 
support or any arguable basis in law. . . .”163 
When the defendants moved for attorneys’ fees, however, the trial court 
awarded a fee of one dollar.164  The court acknowledged that Nader’s case was not 
the “typical” SLAPP that the anti-SLAPP statute was enacted to address.165  “The 
character of this litigation brought, by a candidate for President of the United 
States, against one of the two major political parties, is significantly different in 
tone and tenor” from the typical SLAPP cases.166  The court reasoned: 
This case does not pit a wealthy developer against a citizen of modest means . . . 
This case involves a candidate for national elective office seeking to put forth his 
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ideas to the national electorate for their consideration and approval and the 
defendants alleged calculated efforts to interfere, discourage and impede public 
exposure to that candidacy and those ideas.  Those efforts are central to the 
functioning of this democracy.167   
The court acknowledged the competing First Amendment rights at issue in the 
case.168  Nader alleged that the defendants filed frivolous lawsuits to suppress his 
political participation.  The defendants were asking the court to toss out Nader’s 
lawsuit because it infringed on their right to bring lawsuits. 
In its opinion concerning attorneys’ fees, the court acknowledged that the 
defendants’ request to dismiss Nader’s lawsuit pursuant to Maine’s anti-SLAPP 
lawsuit implicated competing rights of political association, effective voting, Equal 
Protection, and petitioning.  Although the court felt compelled by precedent to 
dismiss the case, it flagged the underlying decision to dismiss the case as one that 
shows how Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute can be applied to protect one party’s First 
Amendment petitioning rights at the expense of the opposing party’s First 
Amendment petitioning rights: 
The broad interpretation and application of this statute, 14 M.R.S. § 556, by the 
Law Court, compels the decision reached by this Court in its decision of 
November 15th.  However, this case involving Candidate Nader, raises significant 
questions concerning the appropriate judicial interpretation of 14 M.R.S. § 556 in 
the context of the Maine and Federal Constitutions and the competing interests 
represented therein.  Whether this Court’s decision of November 15th provides the 
opportunity for that to happen is for others to decide.  But for the impact of legal 
authority in this State relating to 14 M.R.S. § 556, this Court is of the opinion that 
Plaintiffs’ action warranted further analysis and development through the 
evolution of normal civil litigation process.  Defendants Ballot Project and Moffett 
characterize Plaintiffs’ litigation as ‘meritless.’  With all due respect, the merits of 
Plaintiffs’ underlying claims have yet to be evaluated.169 
So, although the trial court dismissed the suit, it awarded only a nominal one 
dollar in attorney’s fees and wrote that binding precedent required it to reach this 
unsettling result.  In Nader’s case, Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute traded one litigant’s 
right to petition for another litigant’s right to petition, without an examination of 
the merits of any of the “petitions” at issue. 
Both parties appealed the decision. 
B. Apparent Change of Burdens on Maine’s Anti-SLAPP Statute and  
Remand to the Trial Court 
On appeal, the Law Court announced a new standard for Maine’s anti-SLAPP 
statute and remanded the case to the trial court.170 
Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute involves two steps of analysis.  In the first step, 
the defendant, as movant on the special motion to dismiss, carries the initial burden 
to show that the suit is based on activity that qualifies as an exercise of the 
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defendant’s First Amendment right to petition the government (Step 1).171  If the 
defendant carries this initial burden, then the statute applies and the burden shifts to 
the plaintiff for step two of the analysis.172  To avoid dismissal, the plaintiff then 
needs to show that the defendant’s petitioning activity: (1) was without “reasonable 
factual support”; (2) was without an “arguable basis in law”; and (3) resulted in 
“actual injury” to the plaintiff (Step 2).173  The plaintiff may make this showing 
through affidavits and the pleadings.174 
Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute does not specify how a court determines whether 
the parties have carried their respective burdens in Step 1 and Step 2.175  Before 
Nader’s suit, courts would review the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
movant – the defendant.176  As a result, if the parties presented conflicting facts, the 
defendant would prevail and the case would be dismissed.  The Law Court 
recognized this “converse summary-judgment-like standard” as working in stark 
contrast with other traditional dispositive motions, where conflicts are resolved in 
favor of the nonmoving party.177 
With motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment, for example, 
courts view pleadings and evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party.  If the movant fails to carry his burden, the case continues to discovery or 
trial.178  Under the traditional model, the party moving to dispose of the case carries 
the heavier burden.  The Law Court also recognized the problem of viewing 
evidence in favor of a moving party, when the evidence had not yet been subject to 
discovery or trial.  “Application of this standard becomes problematic when the 
‘evidence’ to be viewed most favorably to the moving party is disputed and 
consists only of pleadings and statements in affidavits not yet subject to discovery 
or trial.”179  Recognizing the “converse summary-judgment-like standard” as a 
“creature of case law,” the Law Court saw fit to change the standard.180   
The Law Court established a new standard for analyzing whether a plaintiff 
carries his burden at Step 2 of the analysis.  Under the new standard, a plaintiff 
must present prima facie evidence, and the court must infer that the allegations in 
the plaintiff’s complaint and affidavits are true.181  The court described prima facie 
evidence as proof of “enough evidence to allow a fact-finder to infer the fact at 
issue and rule in the party’s favor.”182  The plaintiff must present “some evidence” 
of every element.183  The court described this threshold as a “low standard that does 
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not depend on the reliability or credibility of evidence . . . .”184  Under this new 
standard, the plaintiff would be able to avoid dismissal, “even when faced with 
conflicting evidence from the defendant.”185 
After establishing the new standard, the Law Court remanded Nader’s case to 
the trial court.186  Applying the new standard, the trial court found that Nader made 
a prima facie showing that the defendants’ petitioning activities were devoid of any 
reasonable factual support or arguable basis in law, which would have allowed the 
case to proceed to trial.187 
Of course, the defendants appealed this decision, too.   
C. Retreat to Unconstitutional Application of Maine’s Anti-SLAPP Statute 
In May of 2013, the Law Court took issue with the way the trial court applied 
the newly-announced standard. The Court vacated the judgment of the trial court 
and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case under Maine’s anti-SLAPP 
statute.188 
In its first opinion (Nader 1), the Court stated that Nader “should be allowed to 
proceed” if he presented prima facie evidence that “any, rather than all” of 
defendant’s petitioning activities were “devoid of any reasonable factual support or 
arguable basis in law.”189  In its second opinion (Nader 2), the court glommed 
together many of the petition challenges and characterized the underlying 
petitioning activity as only “three discrete petitioning activities”: (1) Benjamin 
Tucker’s complaint to the Secretary of State;190 (2) Melanson’s complaint to the 
Secretary of State; and (3) Melanson’s appeals to the Superior Court and to the 
Law Court.191  
Instead of looking at Nader’s evidence that many of the individual challenges 
to the nomination petition lacked support and a basis in law, the Law Court defined 
“petitioning activity” as the group of challenges in a particular filing, and 
determined that it would be satisfied if at least one of the individual challenges in a 
filing had some arguable basis in law.  This characterization is at odds with the 
language of the anti-SLAPP statute itself, which defines “petitioning activity” to 
include “any written or oral statement made before or submitted to a legislative, 
executive or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding.”192  “[A]ny 
written . . . statement” should include any written statement in a court filing, even if 
the written statement appears next to written statements that have a basis in law. 
Under this framework, the court ignored evidence that many of the individual 
challenges lacked support.  Defining “petitioning activity” as the collective group 
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of challenges, as opposed to each individual challenge, enabled the Law Court to, 
essentially, apply the inverse standard of the one initially announced.  Instead of 
determining whether any of the challenges to the nomination petition were devoid 
of support or a basis in law, the Court looked to see if any of the challenges had 
support or a basis in law.193  The Law Court found that the challenge over the birth 
name of one of Nader’s presidential electors (John Noble Snowdeal v. J. Noble 
Snowdeal v. Joseph Noble Snowdeal) had a technical basis in law and that this 
saved all of the petition challenges in Melanson’s complaint.194  It then found that 
the appeal over the propriety of the signature petition forms, which were designed 
by the Secretary of State, also had a technical basis in law.195  Without examining 
the basis of the appeals of Melanson’s other three challenges, the Law Court found 
that Melanson’s entire appeal had a basis in law.196  The process employed in 
Nader 2 was a far cry from the standard announced in Nader 1.  In terms of 
guidance for future litigants, it seems that a technical legal basis for one claim will 
validate a host of baseless claims, as long as the claims are part of the same 
pleading. 
Nader 2 also departs from the prima facie standard announced in Nader 1.  
Nader 1 held that courts must “infer that the allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint 
and factual statements in any affidavits responding to a special motion to dismiss 
are true.”197  But in Nader 2, the Law Court ignores much evidence, and primarily 
addresses evidence that it finds insufficient.  For example, on the issue of whether 
the Democratic Party was behind the Tucker complaint, Nader pointed out that 1) 
an exhibit to the Tucker complaint is a letter from a California elections official to 
one of the attorneys who filed the Democratic Party’s Pennsylvania challenge; 2) 
the organization of another one of the named defendants paid this attorney’s firm 
for the costs associated with that challenge; and 3) the Democratic Party retained 
the other law firm that filed the challenge.198  One would think that this would 
satisfy the definition of prima facie evidence set forth in Nader 1:  
[P]roof only of enough evidence to allow the fact-trier to infer the fact at issue and 
rule in the party’s favor. . . . [O]nly some evidence on every element of proof 
necessary to obtain the desired remedy. . . . [P]rima facie proof is a low standard 
that does not depend on the reliability or credibility of the evidence, all of which 
may be considered at some later time in the process.199   
But, Nader 2 does not discuss this evidence.  Instead, it picks out other evidence 
that Nader did not present, and states that other averments made “on information 
and belief” do not satisfy the burden of producing prima facie evidence.200   
Although the Law Court announced a “new standard” in Nader 1, its 
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instructions for applying the “new standard” in Nader 2 undermine the initial 
message and leave a murky precedent. 
D.  Eliminating Both Burden-Shifting Mechanisms from  
Maine’s Anti-SLAPP Statute  
Aside from the mixed messages about Step 2 of the analysis for Maine’s anti-
SLAPP statute, neither of the Law Court’s opinions address the weird standard 
courts have been applying in Step 1 of the analysis.  
Now, courts must infer that the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint and 
affidavits are true for Step 2, but courts should also make this inference in Step 1, 
when the court needs to decide whether the suit is based on activity that qualifies as 
an exercise of the defendant’s First Amendment right to petition the government.   
Even though Nader alleged that the defendants initiated challenges and 
appeals, and issued subpoenas and other discovery, which were devoid of factual 
support or an arguable basis in law, the court found that the defendants’ activity 
was protected by the First Amendment and that the anti-SLAPP statute applied.201  
Because at Step 1 the courts in Maine look to the general underlying action of the 
complaint (litigation), as opposed to what is more specifically pled (frivolous 
litigation), the anti-SLAPP statute will apply to all abuse of process and wrongful 
use of civil procedure claims. 
Accordingly, all plaintiffs bringing these claims will be subjected to the 
heightened standards of Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute.  Even under the revised 
standard at Step 2, the statute creates extra burdens on plaintiffs.  Without the aid 
of discovery, plaintiffs bringing these claims will have to come forward with prima 
facia evidence that the defendant engaged in litigation that (1) was without 
“reasonable factual support”; (2) was without an “arguable basis in law”; and (3) 
resulted in “actual injury” to the plaintiff.202  To the extent that this prima facia 
evidence standard is higher than the notice pleading standard applicable to all other 
claims made under Maine law, Maine has now set a different pleading standard for 
certain torts.203  And, according to Nader II, the prima facia standard applied in 
Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute far exceeds the notice pleading standard applied to all 
other torts, under any other statutes. 
It also follows that Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute imposes additional elements to 
claims for abuse of process.  As discussed above, all abuse of process claims will 
be subject to the anti-SLAPP statute because at the base of all of these claims is a 
process or petition that Maine courts give First Amendment protection to, 
regardless of whether the complaint alleges the abuse of the process or the 
baselessness of the petition.204  
Under Maine law, two elements are required to sustain a claim for abuse of 
process: (1) “the use of process in a manner improper in the regular conduct of the 
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proceeding,” and (2) “the existence of an ulterior motive.”205  At Step 2 of the 
analysis in motions to dismiss brought pursuant to Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, the 
plaintiff must come forward with prima facia evidence that the defendant engaged 
in litigation that (1) was without “reasonable factual support;” (2) was without an 
“arguable basis in law;” and (3) resulted in “actual injury” to the plaintiff.206  
Accordingly, a plaintiff bringing an abuse of process claim will be required to 
present prima facie evidence of elements wholly separate and apart from the 
elements that constitute his claim.  Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute imposes these extra 
elements, and then requires a plaintiff to present evidence of them without the aid 
of discovery.  
Although the Law Court recognized that the “converse summary-judgment-
like standard” in play with the anti-SLAPP statute ran contrary to the standards 
applicable to other dispositive motions, the Law Court only changed the standard 
applied to Step 2 of the analysis.  As for Step 1 of the analysis, when the defendant 
is required to show that the suit is based on activity that receives protection from 
the First Amendment, the evidence is still viewed in a light most favorable to the 
moving party – the defendant.  The court is not necessarily accepting the truth of 
the plaintiff’s allegations, even though the anti-SLAPP statute is a vehicle for 
dismissal.  When the parties present conflicting facts (e.g. the plaintiff alleges that 
the defendant’s litigation was baseless and the defendant submits an affidavit 
stating that it was not), the defendant prevails and the statute applies.  The analysis 
then moves to Step 2.   
The court should view the pleadings and evidence in a light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party (the plaintiff) at Step 1 as well as at Step 2.  Without the aid 
of discovery, the defendant is in a much better position to come forth with evidence 
that it had probable cause for bringing its litigation.  The party bringing the 
underlying petition shouldn’t even need discovery to show that its petitioning was 
premised on “reasonable factual support” and an “arguable basis in law.”  The 
initiator of litigation is in a better position to show probable cause for the litigation, 
so it should not also receive a beneficial standard on this issue.  Further, as 
recognized by the Law Court in the context of Step 2, courts traditionally view 
evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party in dispositive motions.207 
The Law Court made some corrective measures to how Maine’s anti-SLAPP 
statute is applied, but it should change the way courts view the pleadings and 
evidence in Step 1, as well as Step 2 of the statute.  Suits seeking redress for 
SLAPPs, which typically take the form of claims for abuse of process or malicious 
prosecution, as well as other types of malicious prosecution and abuse of process 
claims, are now subjected to heightened pleading standards.  The anti-SLAPP 
statute also imposes an extra element to abuse of process claims.  Ironically, suits 
actually seeking redress for SLAPPs will be subjected to the heightened pleading 
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standards of Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute. 
VI. ELIMINATION OF PRIVATE CHALLENGES TO NOMINATION PETITIONS 
Moving back to the root of Election SLAPPs, here are the problems with 
allowing private challenges to nomination petitions: 1) While the nomination 
petition system is designed to only allow candidates with a prerequisite amount of 
voter support to appear on the ballot, only those candidates who actually have that 
support (and therefore pose a threat to an opponent), will actually draw petition 
challenges (in other words, the challenges are not likely to be used for their 
intended purpose); 2) No one will challenge the nomination petitions of those most 
likely to lack the requisite voter support; 3) The task of responding to petition 
challenges and appeals exponentially increases the burden an independent 
candidate faces when trying to get on a state’s ballot; 4) The task of responding to 
petition challenges and appeals on a state-by-state basis in a federal election further 
compounds this burden, and the burden is not likely accounted for when state 
legislators assess the burden of compliance with their state’s nomination petition 
requirements. 
A true analysis of the burden imposed on an independent presidential 
candidate seeking ballot access needs to incorporate the burdens of complying with 
the ballot access restrictions and validation procedures of 51 different territories.  
Examined under this framework, the piece-meal nature of the federalist electoral 
process, plus the availability of private challenges to nomination petitions, creates 
an undue burden on independent candidates.  An independent candidate could face 
limitless and simultaneous petition challenges, and appeals, in far-flung forums 
across the country, all during a compressed and time-sensitive period in the 
campaign cycle.208  Nader’s 2004 experience shows the reality of this undue 
burden.  The coordinated challenges issued by the DNC against the Campaign’s 
nomination petitions in 19 different forums were effective in diluting the 
Campaign’s force during a critical time in the election cycle, even though the 
overwhelming majority of the challenges and appeals failed on their merits.209 
The judicial contours of Nader’s lawsuits against the DNC for its use/abuse of 
the challenge process show how such behavior is not easily sanctioned by filing a 
lawsuit.  Existing case law does not provide ready answers to the questions 
presented by Nader’s case.  Can a slew of claims, some with merit, most without, 
constitute an abuse of process claim?210  Would Nader have to “prove that the 
Democrats’ overall strategy was itself objectively baseless,” or would it be 
sufficient for Nader to “show only that the Democrats’ strategy resulted in more 
than one baseless suit”?211  The courts presented with Nader’s case have not yet 
answered these questions, but they loom large. 
The courts presented with Nader’s claims did acknowledge the complex 
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analysis demanded by the claims.  Jurisdictional issues could arise if a judge in one 
territory was asked to make determinations concerning cases tried and decided by 
different judges in different forums.212  Choice of law issues would abound if a 
judge was asked to distinguish between a lost challenge and a baseless challenge.213  
If each challenge required separate consideration, a judge would face a separate 
legal standard for each forum and would have to determine: 
(1) what makes a valid ballot challenge in State X? (2) What is State X’s law of 
probable cause for purposes of malicious prosecution? and (3) Does State X have a 
special standard for . . . sending a letter to an election commission or for election 
law issues in general?214  
When faced with Nader’s case the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
acknowledged this trying analysis and noted that “the merits of Nader’s claims 
present state law issues of first impression.”  Rather than tackling this analysis, the 
court affirmed the dismissal of the case on statute of limitations grounds.215 
Finally, judicial recourse after-the-fact is cold comfort to a candidate who was 
denied the ability to fully participate in an election.  Post-election judicial redress 
could not provide an independent candidate with another shot at the election.  
Judicial redress in the middle of the fray would not necessarily alleviate the burden 
imposed by the frivolous challenges.  Because of the burden imposed on a 
candidate in defending the nation-wide petitions, it is unlikely the campaign would 
have the resources to bring individual malicious prosecution counterclaims or Rule 
11 motions during the course of the actual challenges or that such claims would be 
resolved in time to matter.  Even if it did, engaging in additional litigation during 
the time sensitive campaign period would exacerbate the underlying problem of 
being entangled in litigation in the first place. 
Coordinated, aggregated challenges to nomination petitions are an effective 
way to handicap a campaign in a way not envisioned by the individual challenge 
procedures themselves.  Under the existing system, private parties can coordinate 
and aggregate their challenges in a way that perverts the purpose of the individual 
challenge mechanisms.  Aggregated challenges do not identify ineligible candidates 
and then keep them off of state ballots; aggregated challenges create an undue 
burden that prevents ineligible and eligible candidates alike from appearing on state 
ballots.  Instead of relying on private, partisan enforcement, states should audit the 
nomination petitions using a universally applied, neutral, predetermined process, 
such as statistical sampling.  State audits would eliminate the uneven enforcement 
created by the private challenge systems in place in most states.  They would create 
a neutral validation system that would apply evenly to all independent candidates, 
not just those targeted by opponents. The criteria and methods for the statistical 
sampling should be set forth in advance and allow some measure of predictability 
for independent candidates seeking to comply with the signature requirements.  The 
audits should be final, thus eliminating the use of appeals by a well-funded private 
party to prolong the validation procedure. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Nader’s 2004 plight shows how coordinated ballot challenges can cripple a 
campaign.  The current system allows private parties to create undue procedural 
burdens to ballot access by aggregating petition challenges.  This use of petition 
challenges does not advance the states’ interests of: 1) keeping ineligible 
candidates off of the ballot; or 2) eliminating voter confusion.  In fact, only serious 
candidates who threaten another candidate are likely to inspire petition challenges.  
Eliminating the availability of private challenges to nomination petitions would 
create a less partisan validation system.  And, the private challenge mechanism 
could be replaced by state audits, which would result in a more even enforcement 
of a state’s nomination petition requirements.   
Nader’s 2004 plight shows how there is no safeguard against the use of 
concerted frivolous lawsuits to manipulate the election process, as long as private 
challenges remain available.  Nader’s post-election lawsuits show the difficulty in 
obtaining post-election legal redress.  Nader’s post-election lawsuit in Maine has 
led to at least a surface-level adjustment to the way courts apply Maine’s anti-
SLAPP statute, but the Law Court’s most recent order allows a singular 
nonfrivolous petition to protect frivolous petitions in the same filing from sanction, 
and continues to impose extra burdens on a particular class of litigants – those most 
likely to be seeking redress for SLAPPs or for other malicious uses of prosecution.  

